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Abstract: 
The May 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was the first such conference in a decade to conclude with a substantive 
Final Document, containing a 64 point Action Plan. How significant was the 
agreement reached by consensus at the Conference, and what does it portend for 
the health of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime? This 
paper assesses the outcome across the three ‘pillars’ of the NPT—nuclear 
disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—as well as 
the major regional and institutional issues addressed at the conference. It 
concludes that the result of the 2010 Review Conference is best described as a 
status quo outcome and little was achieved in resolving the underlying tensions 
that threaten the NPT's authority. 
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The NPT Review Conference: 
An Assessment of Outcome and Outlook 
In May 2010, a month long Review Conference of the (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was held at the UN in New York. Representatives of 172 out of the 189 members or states 
parties to the Treaty were in attendance, along with over 1,000 non-governmental representatives 
from more than 120 organisations. The Review Conference, which is held once every five years, 
was chaired by Ambassador Cabactulan of the Philippines. It concluded on May 28 with the 
adoption of a 31 page Final Document, containing a 64 point Action Plan for follow-up activity.
1
 
Given that the previous Review Conference in 2005 had failed to adopt any substantive 
concluding document, there was audible relief within the international community that this 
Conference, of arguably the most important international security treaty in existence, had 
managed at least this measure of success. How significant was the outcome of the Review 
Conference in reality and what does it portend for the health of the global nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament regime? These are questions that will be addressed in this paper.  
Background 
The NPT entered into force in 1970 and for 40 years it has been the centre of the 
multilateral framework of agreements governing nuclear matters. It is the most widely adhered to 
international security accord extant, with only four states (India, Pakistan, Israel and North 
Korea) not parties to it. The Treaty is frequently referred to as “the cornerstone” of the 
international security system—a term which has been repeated so often and so mechanically as 
to have taken on cliché status. The NPT was negotiated and signed in 1968. It dealt with the 
major challenges posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear energy via a tripartite ‘grand bargain’. 
The first part of the bargain calls for the Non-Nuclear Weapon States to foreswear the right to 
acquire nuclear weapons and prohibits the five Nuclear Weapon States (US, UK, France, Russia 
and China) from providing such weapons to other states. The second part of the bargain obliges 
the Nuclear Weapon States (quoting from Article VI of the Treaty) “to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 11/2011        6 
 
and to nuclear disarmament.” The third part of the bargain acknowledges the right of all 
members to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and it encourages full cooperation among 
members to support this goal. Forty years later, this fundamental tripartite bargain is still at the 
heart of the NPT and is crucial to an understanding of the pressures that the Treaty has been 
subjected to in trying to achieve and reconcile its sometimes competing objectives. 
Somewhat surprisingly for a multilateral agreement of such importance, the NPT has 
little in the way of supporting structures. It lacks a standing bureau or executive council. It has 
no annual conference of states parties and no secretariat or dedicated implementation 
organization for the Treaty as a whole. The Treaty membership meets in a decision-making 
mode only once every five years, with three preparatory meetings in the intervening period, and 
there is no provision for convening emergency meetings of the membership. These gaps have led 
some observers to speak of the ‘institutional deficit’ of the NPT and to propose reforms to 
correct this situation (more on this later). At present however, the only official opportunity to 
take decisions regarding the Treaty is at the quinquennial Review Conferences, hence the focus 
on last May’s session. The review conferences normally consider the implementation of the 
Treaty during the review period (the preceding five years) and set out recommendations on 
future action to advance the purposes of the NPT. This work is carried out via three Main 
Committees that correspond to the three parts or ‘pillars’ of the Treaty as enumerated above, 
namely disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use. In addition, provision is made for 
subsidiary bodies of each of these Committees to consider specific issues. At this Review 
Conference, subsidiary bodies on nuclear disarmament, regional issues and institutional issues 
were established. The most important procedural point to retain is that all the decisions of the 
Review Conference are taken on the basis of consensus (i.e., no state objects to the Final 
Document). Obtaining consensus on text can be extremely challenging and much depends on the 
diplomatic skills of the President of the Review Conference. Given the dynamics at the May 
2010 Review Conference, Ambassador Cabachtulan, unable to obtain full consensus on the 
review section of his Final Document, was obliged to present this first part on his own authority 
as President. This relegated the 19 page text to the status of a Chair’s summary of the 
proceedings; that is, a personal account not considered binding on the states parties. The second 
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section of the document, entitled “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions,” was 
adopted by the Conference as a whole and is deemed binding on the states parties. Binding in 
this context is understood as politically binding, because whereas the NPT is a treaty and hence 
legally binding on its members, the results of the Review Conferences are considered as political 
engagements undertaken by the parties to the Treaty. The consensus decisions of Review 
Conferences carry great weight and are considered to represent a cumulative body of decisions 
that should govern the behaviour of NPT member states. Although the Final Document included 
a 121 paragraph long “review” section, which would merit a separate discussion of its own, the 
focus of the present assessment will be on the “forward looking” section adopted by consensus 
and thus considered binding on the states parties. 
Political Context of the Review Conference 
The May Review Conference was held at a particularly trying time for the NPT and the 
global nuclear regime centered on it. For years tensions have built up over compliance concerns 
with the Treaty—specifically, concerns by some states that the Treaty’s non-proliferation 
obligations were being flouted by certain states parties (namely Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and 
North Korea) and concerns by other states that the NPT’s Nuclear Weapon States were failing to 
live up to their commitments on nuclear disarmament. In addition, there was also rising concern 
over the vulnerability to abuse of the Treaty’s peaceful use of nuclear energy provisions. For 
example, states such as Iraq and North Korea pursued clandestine nuclear weapons programs 
under the guise of civilian nuclear energy programs and benefited from technical cooperation 
pursuant to the NPT. These tensions and conflicts among states parties had contributed to the 
failure of the 2005 Review Conference and there was widespread concern that the NPT could not 
afford another divisive debacle in 2010. There were several disturbing developments in the 
period leading up to the May Review Conference. There were protracted disputes with Iran over 
the nature of its nuclear programs, which resulted in several UN Security Council resolutions 
critical of Tehran. There were unanswered questions regarding an apparent covert nuclear 
facility in Syria and provocative nuclear testing by North Korea—the unique defector from the 
NPT. In addition, continued blockage in multilateral disarmament efforts, most notably in the 
decade long impasse at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, had prevented any 
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substantial work from being undertaken. Unfinished business from earlier NPT decisions also 
included the failure to bring the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force 
some 14 years after its signature. 
The advent of the Obama Administration provided some welcome political signals in the 
lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The President re-energised bilateral nuclear 
reduction negotiations with Russia and in a landmark speech in Prague in April 2009 he 
embraced, at least in declaratory policy, the vision of a nuclear weapons free world. At the same 
time, the delivery on many of Obama’s disarmament commitments announced in Prague was 
unrealized by May 2010. Changing domestic political fortunes were beginning to derail his 
promises to obtain early ratification of the new START accord as well as the CTBT. 
Furthermore, Obama’s decision to endorse the US–India Nuclear Cooperation agreement, 
concluded under the Bush Administration, cast a shadow over the NPT and the commitment of 
its states parties to the Treaty’s universality. This deal effectively gave India the benefits of NPT 
membership without India assuming the Treaty’s obligations. Finally, Egypt, with the support of 
the Arab League and many members of the 118 member Non-Aligned Movement, which it was 
chairing at the time of the Review Conference, had been signalling its discontent with the failure 
to make progress on implementing the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. This resolution 
was a crucial component of the 1995 Review Conference’s outcome. It was part of a package of 
decisions that enabled agreement at that Review Conference on the indefinite extension of the 
NPT, seen at the time as a major gain for global nuclear regulation. The Middle East resolution 
calls for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle 
East. Egypt highlighted the resolution as an issue requiring substantial treatment at the Review 
Conference and made progress on it a condition for obtaining Egyptian consent to the rest of the 
Review Conference’s results. It was in this challenging political context that the 172 
participating delegations met in New York in May 2010 to seek an agreed outcome which would 
provide important guidance to the NPT membership going forward into the next five year period. 
This paper will now turn to the results of the Review Conference and in particular to an 
examination of the conclusions and 64 point Action Plan which the Conference adopted by 
consensus. 
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Evaluating the Results 
Given the failure of the 2005 Review Conference and the pronounced strains on the 
Treaty that had been building up over the decade, the fact that the 2010 Review Conference 
managed to agree on some substantial Final Document was heralded at the time as a major 
success. The inclusion of a 64 point Action Plan which sounds good to the general public was 
also a clever feature of the document. Product packaging is as important to diplomacy as it is to 
marketing. But what was the real content of this document and how much significant progress 
did it represent in coping with the challenges to the NPT? One of the NGO observers of the NPT 
process came closer to the truth about the conclusion of the Review Conference when she wrote: 
“While hailed by many governments and news outlets as a success, the carefully crafted Final 
Document essentially preserves the status quo on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, 
reflecting reticence by both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states to agree to meaningful new 
commitments.”2 To judge the validity of this opinion let us consider the Review Conference’s 
consensus conclusions under the key rubrics of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Let us also assess the outcomes on regional 
issues, withdrawal and institutional questions. 
Nuclear Disarmament 
Perhaps the first thing to note in reviewing this section and the 22 action points 
associated with it is how many of the points consist of reaffirmation of commitments previously 
entered into and still unfulfilled. This section contains several prominent but not particularly 
reassuring calls for states to act in keeping with their obligations under the NPT. The first action 
point, for example, is “All states parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with 
the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”3 It is revealing as to 
the current authority crisis the NPT faces that the number one action agreed is for states actually 
to respect in practice their legal obligations under the Treaty. Apparently the initial draft of this 
section was considerably crisper and more specific in its action points, but it was seriously 
diluted at the behest of the Nuclear Weapon States during the course of the Review Conference.
4
 
The text is full of general and elastic formulations that will allow great leeway for the Nuclear 
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Weapon States to interpret for themselves what constitutes “further efforts to reduce and 
ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons.” In Action 5, for example, the Nuclear 
Weapon States “commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear 
disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in a way 
that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security.”5 So in 
return for a handful of nice sounding phrases—“accelerate”; “concrete progress”; “steps”—
actual action on disarmament is left to the sole discretion of the Nuclear Weapon States. If this 
ambiguity on necessary action was not sufficient to serve the interests of the Nuclear Weapon 
States, they arranged to further condition the commitment section with a series of vague 
factors—“international stability”, “peace” and “undiminished security”—which again are 
exclusively up to the Nuclear Weapon States to define. Furthermore, the next sentence in the 
chapeau calls upon the Nuclear Weapon States “to promptly engage with a view to inter alia” as 
a preface to listing seven general steps related to disarmament. One does not need to be a lawyer 
to recognise that engaging to do something “with a view to inter alia” is not much of a 
commitment. 
Looking at the seven steps that represent the content of Action 5, there is regrettably little 
of substance among them. In some cases they actually represent a retreat from the corresponding 
step in the 2000 NPT Review Conference outcome—which this whole action point is ostensibly 
dedicated to fulfilling. It is necessary to recall in this context that in 2000 the Final Document of 
the NPT Review Conference contained a explicit listing of actions that the Nuclear Weapon 
States agreed to implement as a measure of their fulfillment of their Article VI disarmament 
obligations. These became known as the 13 Practical Steps. Perhaps because these steps were 
rather specific and significant, they were largely ignored by the Nuclear Weapon States and 
explicitly rejected by France and the United States (under the Bush Administration) despite these 
states agreement to them as part of the package of commitments obtained in 2000. 
An example of backsliding from earlier commitments is contained in the sub-item of 
Action 5 concerning the reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons, also referred to 
as “de-alerting.” This action aims to reduce the risk of accidental launch by lengthening the time 
required to fire a nuclear-tipped missile. At present, the majority of these strategic missiles are 
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still on high alert status, which allows for rapid firing. Two decades after the end of the Cold 
War, many question the necessity of maintaining such a quick fire posture, given the state of the 
world and the survivability of the nuclear deterrent of the principal nuclear powers. In the 2000 
NPT Review Conference document, the Nuclear Weapon States were to fulfill the de-alerting 
objective by taking “[c]oncrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of 
nuclear weapons systems.” In the 2010 Review Conference document, the Nuclear Weapon 
States are to “consider the legitimate interest of the non-nuclear weapon states in further 
reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international 
stability and security.”6 In a rather perverse revision, the Nuclear Weapon States’ obligation is 
reduced to “consider[ing] the legitimate interest of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States.” One does 
not have to be a cynic to conclude that the probable result of such a consideration (if it even gets 
to that stage) by a Nuclear Weapon State is that no further action is required on its part. The 
concerned Non-Nuclear Weapon States are presumably to be satisfied that their “legitimate 
interest” in de-alerting has been recognised by the high and mighty around the nuclear table. 
The only specificity of obligation amid the diluted formulas of Action 5 is the suggestion 
(being “called upon” is not really a requirement) that the Nuclear Weapon States should report 
on the undertakings of Action 5 to the 2014 Preparatory Committee of the NPT review cycle. 
This reporting request is in itself redundant, as step 12 of the 13 steps from 2000 required 
“regular reports” from all states parties on the implementation of Article VI (the disarmament 
article). Action 20 of the 2010 Final Document essentially repeats this requirement. The Nuclear 
Weapon States’ record in submitting such reports has been spotty at best. In one of the few 
points of any innovation in the 2010 outcome, Action 21 encourages the Nuclear Weapon States 
“to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting 
intervals for the purposes of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to 
national security.”7 Under the same action point, the UN Secretary General is invited to establish 
a publicly accessible repository that includes the information provided by the Nuclear Weapon 
States. What in practice will come out of this item remains to be seen, but anything that promotes 
greater accountability by the Nuclear Weapon States as to the extent of compliance with their 
nuclear disarmament obligation is to be welcomed. 
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On the big, outstanding disarmament commitments such as the CTBT entry into force 
and the negotiation of a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT), the 2010 document only 
reaffirms existing promises yet to be realised. As the existing text on the FMCT is premised on it 
being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament and that body has been in deadlock for over 
a decade, the prospects for early action on this commitment are not good. As part of Action 15, 
there is an invitation to the Secretary General to convene a meeting in September to consider the 
CD and support its return to work. This meeting was duly held on September 24 of 2010 in New 
York but it yielded no near term solution for the impasse in the CD and the Secretary General 
was obliged to turn the whole problem over to his Disarmament Advisory Board to ruminate on. 
To sum up on the disarmament front, the 2010 Review Conference left the NPT vehicle in 
basically the same condition as it was in before the gathering—in a rut and spinning its wheels. 
Non-proliferation 
Under this rubric the 2010 document sets out 23 action points that again largely reaffirm 
previous undertakings. Many of the points support the global nuclear safeguards system 
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This system aims to ensure 
that the non-proliferation obligation of the NPT (Article III) is implemented. It does so by 
confirming that there has been no diversion of nuclear material to proscribed purposes (i.e., 
nuclear weapons). Concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA is the basic 
obligation that all NPT states parties assume. There are still 18 states parties that have not yet 
fulfilled this obligation, and Action 25 usefully urges these countries to do so without further 
delay. The more controversial element of the safeguards system is the so-called Additional 
Protocol, which was developed by the IAEA in 1997 following revelations of the clandestine 
nuclear weapons program conducted by Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s rule. The Additional 
Protocol gives the IAEA further authorities and inspection powers to allow it to monitor not only 
nuclear material at declared facilities but also possible undeclared material or facilities. At 
present 107 of the 189 NPT states parties have Additional Protocols in force and Action 28 
encourages all states parties to conclude such protocols as soon as possible. The Additional 
Protocol remains a voluntary undertaking, however, and some Non-Nuclear Weapon States, 
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notably Brazil and Egypt, have resisted assuming this further non-proliferation obligation as long 
as the Nuclear Weapon States do not submit to similar constraints on the disarmament side. 
While there are positive calls for states to provide “political, technical and financial 
support “to the IAEA to enable it to discharge its responsibilities, this section contains no 
specific commitments. There are other action points promoting adherence to some existing 
nuclear non-proliferation-related conventions. There are also calls to improve national capacities 
to deal with illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Over all, this section of the Action Plan 
represents a reasonable, if rather prosaic outcome that skirts around some of the more thorny 
issues in the non-proliferation area. 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
Reaffirmation of existing rights is the principal theme of this section, with its 17 action 
points. The usual tensions between facilitating transfers of nuclear technology, on the one hand, 
and ensuring that non-proliferation obligations are respected, on the other, are much in evidence. 
Action 51 calls for the elimination of “any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty” in 
facilitating international nuclear cooperation.
8
 Efforts to reduce the amount of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) in civilian hands (with a non-proliferation motivation) received only weak 
endorsement. Action 61’s encouragement to minimize HEU in civilian stocks was caveated 
however by the phrases “on a voluntary basis” and “where technically and economically 
feasible.”9 The most significant development in this realm in recent years has been the 
development of proposals for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, an initiative of 
the former Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed El Baradei. The rationale is to eliminate 
the need for states to develop their own enrichment and reprocessing capacities that enable the 
production of weapons-grade fissile material, and hence remove the potential for break-out from 
the NPT’s non-proliferation commitment. The ongoing dispute between Iran and the 
international community over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program has contributed to the interest 
in having a reliable multilateral alternative to nationally based fuel cycles. Although various 
proposals have been forthcoming from some IAEA members, the Agency and its member states 
have not been able to coalesce around any specific proposal. The 2010 Review Conference did 
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not help advance this debate and the relevant action point (58) basically calls for continued 
discussion of the topic without providing significant further guidance or endorsement. 
Regional Issues 
The most important regional issue at the 2010 Review Conference was follow-up to the 
Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. As 
mentioned earlier, this item was a top priority for Egypt and other Arab states coming into the 
2010 Conference. Egypt, a significant player in multilateral disarmament forums, enjoyed an 
additional advantage in being the current chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the 118 
state association that represents those outside of the Cold War era’s East-West divide. Although 
it is arguably an obsolete practice today, the UN is still organized in groupings of states (Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, West European and Others, and Eastern). The NPT has traditionally 
operated on a three-group basis of the NAM, Western and Eastern groups. The allocation and 
rotation of chairmanships and other leadership positions within multilateral bodies are usually 
determined on a regional group basis. For the purpose of this assessment, suffice it to say that 
Egypt benefited in its handling of the Middle East item from the extra clout that its chairmanship 
of the NAM provided. Egypt’s early insistence on some substantial outcome in the matter also 
set up a diplomatic dynamic prior to the Review Conference. Egypt engaged in discussions with 
the US, the principal representative of the 1995 resolution’s target, Israel (the sole non-NPT state 
in the region). While there was considerable backroom discussion during the Review 
Conference, the outcome appeared to be to Egypt’s satisfaction. A conference to consider the 
issue of a nuclear weapon and WMD free zone in the Middle East is to be held in 2012, with the 
participation of all states of the Middle East. A facilitator to prepare this conference and report 
on its follow-up to the next Review Conference is also to be appointed by the Secretary General 
and the US, UK and Russia (the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution). Thus for the first time 
since 1995, a distinct follow-on event and the appointment of a permanent figure responsible for 
monitoring implementation of the Middle East resolution have been agreed. The outcome text 
also refers specifically to the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty, although this 
sentence is immediately followed by another reaffirming “the urgency and importance of 
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achieving universality of the Treaty.” While this singling out of Israel was protested by the US at 
the Review Conference, it was clearly judged to be an acceptable price to pay for agreement on a 
substantial outcome document from the Review Conference.
10
 
Of course, there are other Middle Eastern states which have problematic positions in 
relation to the NPT’s goals but they did not receive direct mention in the outcome document. 
One of the brutal truths of any treaty body that works on a consensus basis, such as the NPT, is 
that it takes only one member to block agreement on any matter, if considered prejudicial to 
national interests. Thus one will search in vain in the Conference documents for criticism of 
Iran’s chequered history of cooperation with the IAEA and the UN Security Council regarding 
its nuclear program. Similarly, there is no reference to Syria’s suspicious refusal to grant the 
IAEA access to certain sites following the destruction of an alleged clandestine nuclear facility 
on its territory. As NPT states parties, in attendance at the Review Conference, both of these 
countries were in a position to prevent any explicit criticism of their government’s actions. The 
rather perfunctory reference to North Korea’s provocative nuclear actions that appears in the last 
paragraph of the outcome document was only possible because of the DPRK’s withdrawal from 
the NPT in 2003. 
Universality 
A further ‘regional’ issue that was not explicitly mentioned in the outcome document but 
was referenced indirectly is that of India and Pakistan, the two other states that have refused to 
sign up to the NPT. The elephant in the room during the Review Conference was of a distinctly 
South Asian species—namely, the US–Indian nuclear cooperation agreement concluded in 2006 
and the subsequent decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), at American instigation, to 
exempt India from its usual guidelines requiring full scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear 
supply. These actions were at variance with pre-existing commitments undertaken as part of the 
1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference outcomes. In the eyes of many Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States this constituted further evidence that the Nuclear Weapon States were prepared to sacrifice 
key NPT aims in order to reap profits from nuclear trade with India. To offer a non-NPT state the 
benefits of NPT membership in the form of nuclear cooperation, without any of its obligations, 
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was to undercut the Treaty and the goal of its universality which all NPT states parties had sworn 
to uphold. In light of these events there was considerable interest in seeing the Review 
Conference reaffirm the goal of universality and the need to refrain from actions that undermined 
this objective. These views were in part reflected in Item VI of the Principles and Objectives 
section of the Conclusions. The text there not only affirmed “the vital importance of universality 
of the Treaty” but also called upon states “not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect 
prospects for the universality of the Treaty,” an indirect critique of actions by the US and the 
NSG.
11
 
The US delegation was unrepentant at the Review Conference regarding its deal with 
India. It apparently intervened strenuously to reject a relevant initiative that appeared in early 
drafts of the outcome. This initiative would have reaffirmed the requirement for “existing and 
new arrangements” on nuclear trade to insist on full scope safeguards as a condition of supply. In 
the end, this language (which was also relegated to the review section of the document, to 
paragraph 117) was only accepted by the United States when the word “existing” was deleted, so 
that it could be read as solely applying to new future arrangements after the NSG exemption for 
India.
12
 The more recent China–Pakistan nuclear cooperation deal, against which the US has 
protested, also raises problems for the NPT. Having created the precedent of this exemption in 
pursuit of their own narrow interests in the case of India, it will be difficult for NSG members to 
argue credibly against an exemption being applied to Pakistan. At the Review Conference, the 
vast majority of the NPT states parties could only manage to register a mild rebuke of the 
violation by leading NPT states of a long standing taboo against nuclear trade with non-NPT 
parties. 
Withdrawal 
Related to the issue of universality is the question of withdrawal from the NPT. Ever 
since North Korea became in 2003 the first NPT signatory to invoke Article X and withdraw 
from the Treaty, the matter has been strenuously debated. Article X of the NPT provides for any 
state which feels its supreme national interests have been jeopardized to leave the Treaty with 
three months’ prior notification to the other states parties and to the UN Security Council. Many 
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considered North Korea’s actions an abuse of this provision, as it had been in violation of NPT 
obligations for some time yet had continued to benefit from the mantle of NPT membership until 
its official withdrawal. Several states (with a view to potential defectors such as Iran and Syria) 
argued that this represented a vulnerability in the Treaty that should be addressed through 
interpretative statements agreed at the Review Conference. These would have asserted that a 
withdrawing state which was in violation of its Treaty obligations would still be held responsible 
for those violations committed prior to its withdrawal. Interestingly, such an affirmation was 
contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, which was adopted by consensus at the 
special nuclear summit meeting of the Council held on September 24, 2009. A similar 
affirmation, however, proved not to be possible at the Review Conference, as Iran argued that 
Article X was sufficient and any attempt to define it further would amount to a Treaty 
amendment. As the states of the Non-Aligned Movement indicated support for this position, it 
was not possible to insert relevant language in the agreed Conclusions and supporters of tighter 
guidance had to content themselves with three diluted paragraphs (118-120) in the Review 
section of the Final Document.
13
 
Institutional Reform  
One cannot conclude an evaluation of the results of the 2010 Review Conference without 
touching upon the fate of an initiative closely associated with Canada. This is a series of ideas to 
overcome the so-called institutional deficit of the NPT. As noted earlier, despite the status and 
significance of the NPT as a premier international security treaty, it comes with almost no 
infrastructure or supporting mechanisms. The Treaty has no annual conference of states parties, 
no standing bureau or executive council, no secretariat or dedicated implementing organisation 
(the IAEA has a crucial role in implementation but only with respect to one article of the Treaty) 
and no means of convening in a decision making mode outside of its Review Conferences once 
every five years. 
Since 2004, Canada has been advocating a number of reforms to help shore up the NPT 
by providing it with a few institutional supports. While their exact nature has evolved over the 
years, the key proposals consist of 1) instituting annual meetings of states parties empowered to 
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take decisions; 2) establishing a standing bureau or ‘circle of chairs’ to provide some continuity 
between NPT meetings; and 3) creating a position for an NPT-dedicated officer to serve as an 
‘implementation support unit’. Canada set out these proposals in a working paper that was 
supported by 17 cross-regional states parties.
14
 As another example of that diplomatic adage that 
“no good idea goes unpunished,” these practical proposals were subjected to considerable 
dilution in consultations before and during the Review Conference, and were finally set aside. 
The idea of an empowered annual meeting, while probably the most important for a strengthened 
review process, ran into early opposition from several quarters, including the Nuclear Weapon 
States and the NAM. It was dropped at the Review Conference itself. The other two innovations 
looked like they were going to survive until Iran reportedly opposed them in the final days of the 
Conference. With no prospect of gaining consensus, these reform proposals were relegated to the 
review section of the outcome document (paragraphs 110-112) as noted, but non-actionable, 
ideas for this Review Conference. 
The inability of the NPT process to improve the Treaty’s withdrawal provisions and 
institutional deficit was flagged by certain observers. In the words of one respected analyst: 
“After almost a decade of debates on disincentives to make withdrawal from the Treaty more 
difficult and to increase the NPT regime’s tools for accountability, compliance and 
implementation, nothing on these important issues appears in the consensus conclusions and 
recommendations.”15 Here again is an example of how difficult it is to effect reforms within a 
body operating on consensus and where certain states are not especially keen to enhance the 
effectiveness of the NPT review process. 
Conclusions  
It must be noted that the parties’ agreement on some form of substantial outcome 
document at the May 2010 Review Conference was a worthwhile accomplishment given the 
anxiety that was building up around the NPT. At the same time, very little significant progress 
was made on the major challenges facing the Treaty. In this way, the outcome was essentially a 
confirmation of the status quo and does little to resolve the tensions or repair the fault lines that 
threaten the NPT’s authority and viability. Particularly disappointing was the failure to take 
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practical steps to strengthen the Treaty by providing it with even a minimal support structure. 
Regrettably, there appear to be states parties which are not eager to see mechanisms created that 
would put their compliance record under more regular and vigorous scrutiny. 
A longer term assessment of the 2010 Review Conference will also need to await the 
results of implementing the few new operational decisions that were taken at the session. Among 
the items to track are the following: 1) success in getting FMCT negotiations underway, 
including fixing the impasse at the CD or finding new forums for launching these negotiations; 
2) obtaining entry into force for the CTBT; 3) the extent to which the Nuclear Weapon States 
actually submit reports on their disarmament implementation; and 4) whether the WMD-Free 
Zone conference for the Middle East does take place in 2012 as envisaged. Other elements which 
would contribute to a more positive situation for the NPT as a whole are further major cuts in 
deployed nuclear weapons, including sub-strategic weapons, and some steps to lower the current 
high operational status of deployed nuclear forces. 
Ultimately, the NPT, like any international accord, is only as strong as its members’ 
continued support for its objectives. If the careful balance of the NPT’s tripartite bargain is 
allowed to be tipped and individual states no longer see a security benefit for them in adherence 
to the Treaty, it will rapidly lose its power and authority. The resulting jungle politics in the 
nuclear arena may make the international community regret not having done more to reinforce 
the NPT when it had a chance.  
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